Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking by Wolf Wagner
J Financ Serv Res (2010) 37:71–81
DOI 10.1007/s10693-009-0073-8
Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking
Wolf Wagner
Received: 9 October 2008 / Revised: 3 August 2009 / Accepted: 7 August 2009 /
Published online: 3 September 2009
© The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005)
has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the
risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from
falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market
competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason
is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance
sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer
borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus
increases their risk-taking incentives.
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1 Introduction
Competition in the banking sector is typically seen as detrimental to financial
stability. The basic idea is that when banks compete intensely for deposits, interest
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rates fall and their franchise value is eroded. Banks have then less to lose from a
default and their incentives to take on risk increase.1 This argument has been very
important in shaping banking regulation around the world, for instance in the form
of competition and merger policies.
A recent influential paper by Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) has challenged this view.
Boyd and De Nicoló (BdN, henceforth) start from the simple observation that when
banks compete more in the deposit market, they are also likely to compete more
in the loan market. Loan rates should hence decline. BdN show that this gives rise
to a new channel which operates through the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.
First, lower loan rates raise profits for borrowers and thus make bankruptcy less
likely. Moreover, for the same reason that banks choose higher risk when deposit
rates increase, borrowers choose to be safer when loan rates decrease. Both effects
reduce the riskiness of bank loans and thus counter the traditional channel. BdN
consequently argue that the lending market should be central to future models of
bank stability.
This paper extends the analysis of the lending channel. In BdN borrowers are
implicitly assumed, through their influence on the risk of firms, to have complete
control over the riskiness of banks. We argue that, while borrowers may determine
the riskiness of their firms, it is banks who decide how much risk they ultimately
want to take on. They do this, for example, by deciding how much to lend in total
or whether or not to lend to risky industries. Banks also determine the risk of their
loan portfolio through their lending standards, screening and monitoring efforts and
through covenants. To allow for this, we introduce in a model with a lending channel
as in BdN the possibility for banks to select among different types of borrowers. Thus,
we essentially allow for both a risk choice of borrowers as in BdN and a risk choice for
banks. We find that this alteration reverses the stability effect of the lending channel.
We consider a model where a bank finances a single entrepreneur and sets a
lending rate. The entrepreneur can set the risk of his project, and his incentives to do
so depend on the lending rate as in BdN. There are different types of entrepreneurs in
the economy, and the bank can decide which one to finance. The entrepreneurs differ
according to the risk-return profile of their projects such that for a given lending rate
their risk choice results in a different project risk. The bank faces competition from
an entrant at an intermediate stage, which restricts the lending rate it can charge.
In this model, the result of BdN obtains for a given entrepreneur type the bank
finances. We model competition as a reduction in the switching costs an entrepreneur
faces at the intermediate stage. This reduction lowers the lending rate the bank can
charge to an entrepreneur without losing the entrepreneur to the entrant. The lower
lending rate, in turn, reduces the entrepreneur’s incentives to take on risk, and the
bank ends up safer as a consequence.
This result, however, no longer holds when the bank can choose among the
different entrepreneurs. In its decision of which entrepreneur to finance, the bank
fully anticipates the risk level that results from an entrepreneur’s choice at a given
lending rate. When, due to more intense competition, the maximum lending rate it
can charge to all entrepreneurs in the economy declines, the bank hence anticipates
that every given entrepreneur will reduce the riskiness of his project. To understand
1See, among others, Keeley (1990), Allen and Gale (2000), Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2004).
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how the bank will react to this, one has to recall the usual trade-off a bank faces when
it finances a riskier project. On one hand, more risk imply higher returns when the
project succeeds. On the other hand, there is a higher chance that the entrepreneur
defaults, in which case the bank loses the agreed repayment. The result of this trade-
off is a desired level of project risk a bank wants to take on, which depends on the
lending rate the bank can charge. If the bank continues to finance the entrepreneur
it found optimal to finance before the increase in competition, the resulting project
risk would fall below the desired level. The bank has hence an incentive to change
to an entrepreneur with a project of a higher risk-profile who now chooses the same
level of project risk as the bank’s old entrepreneur.
This is, however, not the only effect of competition since at the same time the
bank’s desired risk-taking increases. The reason is that when lending rates decline,
the bank has less to lose from a failure of an entrepreneur’s project (this effect is
basically the same as the one of deposit market competition increasing bank risk-
taking). As a result, the bank finds it optimal to finance an entrepreneur that chooses
a project risk that is even higher than the one of the bank’s old entrepreneur. Banking
stability, therefore, unambiguously falls.
Recent literature has extended the lending channel in different directions.
Martínez and Repullo (2006) show that competition in the loan market may under-
mine bank stability by reducing banks’ margins. They demonstrate that this can give
rise to a U-shaped relation between competition and stability. Boyd et al. (2006)
derive empirical predictions from a model where banks, besides in loans, also invest
in safe assets and find support for their theory. Hakenes and Schnabel (2007) show
that competition in the lending market may induce banks to alter the correlation of
the loans in their portfolio, with the effect on stability potentially going either way.2
In our model banks modify their risk by channeling lending to borrowers with
riskier project types (for example, by increasing lending in high-risk industries). This
is one dimension along which banks can react to safer borrowers following a fall in
lending rates. There are several other margins through which banks can alter their
risk, such as by lowering their screening and monitoring efforts, reducing collateral
requirements and loan restrictions, or by leveraging up their capital structure. While
our paper suggests a relation between these margins and competition due to bank
risk-taking incentives, recent literature has emphasized other factors. In Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2004), faced with more intense competition, banks switch to more
opaque borrowers as this increases adverse selection problems for competitors.
In a similar vein, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that competition among banks
increases their incentives to make relationship loans, as opposed to transactional
loans. The presence of these channels suggest that the impact of competition on bank
stability described in the present paper may be dampened because banks can insulate
themselves from higher lending market competition by investing in loans with higher
informational rents, translating into higher switching costs in our setting. Hauswald
and Marquez (2006) show that higher competition can reduce banks’ incentives to
2Studying the impact of bank heterogeneity, De Nicoló and Loukoianova (2007) allow banks,
as in our model, to choose between different types of entrepreneurs. However, they employ a
parameterization where entrepreneurial risk choices do not depend on their type in equilibrium (the
reason is a precisely offsetting effect that comes from a change in the demand for loans) and hence a
bank’s risk does not change when it switches type.
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acquire information about borrowers. They also show that information acquisition
can act as a deterrent to competition, by creating an adverse selection problem
for competitors. This may amplify the effect of competition, as lower information
acquisition in turn makes banks compete more aggressively. This channel is also
expected to increase the impact of competition in our setting as it results in banks
effectively lowering switching costs in response to competition. Finally, while in our
paper a link between competition and bank risk arises from risk-shifting motives
due to limited liability (both on the bank’s and the entrepreneur’s side), Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2006) present a model where competition affects bank risk through
banks’ incentives to screen. In their setting, a higher inflow of unknown borrowers
into the pool of borrowers reduces adverse selection problems among banks. This
can make it optimal for banks to lower their amount of screening. Even though this
may be desirable from a welfare perspective, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez show that
the resulting increase in lending activity exposes banks to greater risks and hence
reduces financial stability.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets up the model and analyzes
the impact of competition on bank risk-taking. The final section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a setting where a bank finances an entrepreneur through a loan. There
is the classical bank risk-shifting problem emphasized in the literature, which arises
because banks’ financing costs are risk-insensitive. As in BdN, there is also a risk-
shifting incentive at the level of the entrepreneur since in the case of default he is
protected by limited liability. This risk-shifting problem is lessened when lending
rates decline since the entrepreneur then participates to a larger extent in the success
of his project.
Our model closely resembles the one of BdN but there are the following differ-
ences. First, we introduce the possibility for banks to choose between different types
of entrepreneurs (but entrepreneurs still determine the risk level of their projects, as
in BdN). These entrepreneurs differ in their risk choice, that is, at the same lending
rate they would choose different levels of risks. One can think of this heterogeneity in
risk choices as the result of entrepreneurs having projects that differ with respect to
their risk-return trade-off, or as entrepreneurs having different preferences for risk.
Moreover, we shut down the traditional channel by assuming that interest rates
in the deposit market are given. We can thus isolate the effect of competition in the
lending market (we demonstrate later that incorporating the traditional channel only
strengthens our results). It also serves to simplify the analysis by allowing us to keep
the number of projects financed by a bank constant.
Finally, we model competition differently. In BdN increased competition is due
to an increase in the number of banks that compete in a Cournot fashion. Since
we have a continuum of entrepreneur types here (rather than a single type as in
BdN), this setup would create technical complications because banks would then
play Cournot in a large number of (interacting) markets. Instead, we model more
intense competition through declining switching costs for entrepreneurs when they
want to move to another bank.
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2.1 The setup
There are two dates (0 and 1) and three classes of agents: depositors, entrepreneurs
and banks. All agents are risk neutral. Besides investing in the bank, depositors also
have the possibility to invest in a storage technology which gives a return of rS for
every unit invested at date 0. There is a deposit insurance system in place which
fully insures depositors. Depositors are hence risk-insensitive. The deposit insurance
system charges a flat premium of π per unit of deposits. A bank can thus raise funds
at a constant rate of rD := rS + π .
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by k (with k ∈ [kmin, kmax]) which
differ with respect to their projects: an entrepreneur k’s project pays in the case of
success s − k. In the case of failure all projects pay zero. The probability of success is
given by p(s) with ps < 0 (subindices will denote partial derivatives). Entrepreneurs
can choose s (s ∈ [0, s]), that is the risk of the project. The risk choice is not
observable but entrepreneurial types are. The following conditions on p(s) ensure
concavity of the entrepreneur’s problem: p(0) = 1, p(s) = 0 and ps < 0, ps,s < 0. A
project requires one unit of funds. Entrepreneurs have no funds of their own and
have to borrow from a bank at an interest rate r.
As we show formally later, k is an index of the riskiness of an entrepreneur, that is,
an entrepreneur with higher k, ceteris paribus, chooses higher risk s. This is because
of lower benefits in the case of project success (s − k) he obtains.3 An alternative
interpretation of project heterogeneity k is that all projects are initially equal, but
that banks can (partially) influence project risk, for example through collateral and
covenants, or by monitoring.
There is a single bank which has the capacity to process one loan application
(for example, for evaluating the entrepreneur’s business plan). Without processing
the loan application, repayment on the loan would be zero. The bank can thus
only finance one entrepreneur. At an intermediate stage, there is potential entry
by another bank who can make a competing loan offer for the entrepreneur.4 If
the entrepreneur switches banks at this stage, he incurs costs c > 0. They may,
for example, represent the costs of negotiating a new loan contract or costs that
arise because the information gained in the lending process cannot be completely
transferred. These costs are an (inverse) measure of competition.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows. At date 0 , the bank
chooses an entrepreneur k and processes his loan application. The bank subsequently
makes a loan offer r to the entrepreneur. Afterwards, the potential entrant (seeing
the offer of the bank) can make a competing offer r˜ (this can be interpreted as
entrepreneurs ‘shopping around’ with their first loan offer). The entrepreneur then
decides which offer to take and chooses risk s. At the last stage of date 0, the winning
3Note that the expected return on a project is declining in k (for a given s). Thus, our setup
incorporates a natural bias against selecting higher risk entrepreneurs when competition increases.
4Note that the bank will not find it optimal to make an offer to other entrepreneurs at this stage
because repayment would then always be zero. One can also allow this bank (similarly to the first
bank) to process a loan application in the initial stage and then let banks compete for each other’s
entrepreneurs in the intermediate stage, without changing the results.
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bank raises one unit of deposits at rate rD.5 At date 1, the state of nature realizes.
When the project fails, the entrepreneur, and as a result also the bank, default. When
the project succeeds, returns are consumed by the respective agents.
2.2 Solution
We solve the model backwards. The last decision is the entrepreneur’s risk choice.
Given loan rate r and his type k, he chooses s to maximize the expected pay-off from
the project net of the interest rate payment
(s − k − r)p(s). (1)
Note that potential switching costs c are sunk at the time and do not affect the optimal
s. The corresponding first order condition is
p + (s − k − r)ps = 0. (2)
We write s = s(r, k) to indicate the dependence of the entrepreneur’s choice of s on
r and k. From ps < 0 and ps,s < 0 it follows that ds(r,k)dr > 0 and
ds(r,k)
dk > 0, that is risk
increases both in r and k.6 The reason for this is, as already discussed, that an increase
in either k or the loan rate r reduces an entrepreneur’s benefits from project success.
In the preceding stage, the entrepreneur chooses whether to switch to the entrant.
Given switching costs c he stays at his bank if
(s(r) − k − r)p(s(r)) ≥ (s( r˜ ) − k − r˜ )p(s( r˜ )) − c (3)
i.e., if his pay-off from staying ((s(r) − k − r)p(s(r))) is not below the pay-off
from accepting the entrant’s offer and incurring the switching costs ((s( r˜ ) − k − r˜ )
p(s( r˜ )) − c).
In the second stage, loan rates are set. The lowest interest rate the entrant can
set without making a loss is the deposit rate, that is, setting r˜ = rD. We denote with
sD = s(rD) an entrepreneur’s risk choice when the loan rate is rD, and with uD his




) + (sD − k − rD)ps
(
sD
) = 0. (4)
Using Eq. 1, uD is then given by
uD = (sD − k − rD)p(sD). (5)
5The reason for making banks raising deposits at this stage is that at the beginning of the period it
is not clear (off-equilibrium) which bank will finance the entrepreneur and hence will need to raise
funds.
6We have assumed that project output falls linear in k in order to obtain analytical solutions.
However, what is important for the results is that banks can increase their risk by switching between
entrepreneurs, which is guaranteed by ds(r,k)dk > 0 and only requires that project output depends
negatively on k. Only in the case where output does not depend on k at all the bank cannot control
its risk. As we discuss at the beginning of Section 2.3, then the BdN result obtains.
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Thus, the entrant can offer the entrepreneur at most a (net) pay-off of up to
uD − c. Therefore, the maximum interest rate r the (incumbent) bank can set without
losing the entrepreneur to the entrant fulfills
(s − k − r)p(s) = uD − c (6)
We assume that this equation is binding, that is the bank does not find it optimal to
set a lower interest rate (otherwise, competition from the entrant has no effect).7
The entrepreneur’s participation constraint is given by
(s(r) − k − r)p(s(r)) ≥ 0. (7)
We assume that the participation constraint is not binding (relative to the interest
rate constraint coming from competition from the entrant). From Eqs. 6 and 7
this condition writes uD − c ≥ 0. Note that when projects have a positive NPV (if
financed at the competitive rate, rD) we have uD > 0. The participation constraint
then never binds when competition is sufficiently intense, that is when c is small.8
Finally, in the first stage the bank selects the type of entrepreneur it wants to
finance. Specifically, it chooses k to maximize its expected returns
π = (r − rD)p(s) (8)
subject to s and r fulfilling the entrepreneur’s risk choice Eq. 29 and the limit price
Eq. 6. Note that although k has no direct influence on profits, it has an indirect one
through the interest rate r and the risk choice s. In the case of s it can be seen from
Eq. 2 that there are even two channels through which k affects s: a direct one and an
indirect one through the impact of k on r.
2.3 Competition and bank risk-taking
We first use our model to demonstrate the mechanism of BdN. Their results obtain
when the bank cannot choose between different types of entrepreneurs, that is, when
k is fixed. From the interest rate equation (6) we have that a reduction in switching
costs c (higher competition) forces the bank to charge a lower lending rate r. This
is because otherwise the entrepreneur would find it optimal to switch to the entrant.
The lower lending rate in turn increases the entrepreneur’s gains in the case of project
success and the entrepreneur will hence reduce its level of risk (since ds(r,k)dr > 0).
Banks thus end up safer.
We next analyze the impact of competition for when banks can choose between
different entrepreneurs. For this it is useful to restate the bank’s optimization
problem. Since a bank’s choice of k maps into a risk level s (and an interest rate r),
we can also consider the bank’s problem as one of choosing s in order to maximize
7It can be shown that there may in principal be also an interior solution for r (the reason is that
a higher interest rate also causes a higher risk choice s and hence may reduce the bank’s pay-off).
However, the equation always becomes binding when c is sufficiently small because the maximum
interest rate then becomes close to rD.
8In the case the participation constraint binds in the bank’s problem, competition will be ineffective.
9Note that the bank has to take into account the entrepreneur’s FOC as an optimization constraint
because the latter determines the entrepreneur’s risk choice s in the last stage.
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π . The entrepreneur who needs to be selected to induce a certain s, and the interest
rate that results from this choice, are implicitly given by Eqs. 2 and 6. We write k(s)
and r(s) in the following to indicate the k and r that correspond to a risk choice s.
Thus, the bank maximizes π over s subject to k(s) and r(s).
Consider now the impact of a small change in (induced) risk on bank’s equity, i.e.,
the bank’s marginal gains from risk-taking. From Eq. 8 we have
π ′(s) = r′(s)p + (r − rD)ps. (9)
Thus, there are two offsetting effects of higher bank risk. First, it reduces the
likelihood of project success (ps < 0) in which case an amount of r − rD is lost to
the bank (last term in Eq. 9). Second, a higher risk-choice is associated with a higher
lending rate (r′(s) > 0) as previously discussed, from which the bank benefits in the
case of success (first term on the right-hand side of Eq. 9).
We show in the following that a reduction in c (that is, an increase in competition)
raises risk-taking s. For this we prove that the bank’s marginal risk-taking gains π ′(s)
at a given s = s increase when c falls. This amounts to showing that if the bank
following a reduction in c (hypothetically) adjusts k such that its previous risk level s
is restored, its risk-taking gains are still higher than before the reduction in c. From
this it follows that a bank implements an s that is higher than the one that was optimal
before the reduction in c.
Formally, we have to show that dπ
′(s)









since d(p(s))dc = 0 and d(ps(s))dc = 0.
Lemma 1 We have dr
′(s)




dc = 0: Rearranging the entrepreneur’s first order condition (Eq. 2) for r gives
r = s − k + p
ps
. (11)
Taking the total derivative with respect to s yields













Combining the entrepreneur’s first order condition (2) and the interest rate
determination Eq. 6 to eliminate s − k − r and solving for uD gives
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s + p2 ps,s
p2s
. (15)
Since uDk = −p(sD) (from Eq. 5) we get for k′(s) that
k′(s) = −2pp
2
s + p2 ps,s
−p(sD)p2s
. (16)
Note that k′(s) > 0 (since ps,s < 0), confirming that when the bank wants to
induce more risk, it has to pick an entrepreneur with higher k. It follows from
Eq. 16 that dk
′(s)
dc = 0 and hence from Eq. 13 that dr
′(s)
dc = 0 .












Solving for dk(s)dc , inserting into Eq. 17 and using u
D
k = −p(sD) we obtain dr(s)dc =
1
p(sD) . unionsq
Hence we have with Eq. 10 that dπ
′(s)
dc < 0, that is risk-taking increases when
competition intensifies.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. From Eq. 9 we know that a
bank’s risk-taking choice trades off the effect of higher lending rates in the case of
success (r′(s)p > 0) with a lower likelihood of obtaining profits in the good state
((r − rD)ps < 0). In order to analyze the impact of competition on the bank’s risk
taking, we thus have to study how it may modify these two effects. Note first that
an entrepreneur’s probability of success and the sensitivity of this probability with
respect to risk is not directly affected by the level of competition ( ∂p(s)
∂c = 0 and
∂ps(s)
∂c = 0). Since the deposit rate rD is exogenously given, a change in competition
can hence only affect risk-taking incentives in two ways: by changing the trade-off
between lending rates and induced risk (r′(s)) and/or by changing the profit the bank
obtains in case of project success (r − rD) through a change in the lending rate r.
Competition unambiguously lowers lending rates by increasing the threat that the
entrant can lure away an entrepreneur. This implies that r for a given type s has to be
lowered. We thus have that the profit a bank obtains in case of project success from
a given entrepreneur, r − rD , falls. Furthermore, even though competition reduces
lending rates, it does not change the sensitivity of lending rates to entrepreneurial
risk types. This is because all entrepreneurs enjoy lower switching costs and hence
all equally benefit from lower lending rates (r′(s) is thus unchanged). Summing up,
while lending market competition thus reduces the costs of risk-taking by lowering
a bank’s profit in the case of success, it does not affect the benefits from risk-taking.
As a result, the bank ends up taking more risk.
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Before concluding, let us employ our model to analyze the impact of competition
in the deposit market, that is the traditional channel. Higher competition in the
deposit market presumably increases deposit rates rD. Equation 9 shows that this
increases a bank’s risk-taking incentives at a given s (we have dπ
′(s)
drD = −ps > 0).
Hence, the bank has an incentive to react to the increase in the deposit rates by
switching to an entrepreneur with higher risk. The intuition for this result is the
standard one: higher deposit rates reduce the gains a bank obtains in the case of
project success and hence make the bank less concerned about the risk of failure.
3 Conclusions
Understanding the relationship between competition and banking stability is of
paramount importance for designing banking regulation and may ultimately help to
mitigate the risk of financial crises. The traditional view has held that competition
in the banking sector is detrimental for stability since it tends to increase deposit
rates and thus erodes the franchise value of banks. Recent literature has challenged
this view and has emphasized that there is a counteracting channel, which operates
through the loan market. The argument is that competition among banks tends to
reduce loan rates, which makes borrowers safer precisely for the same reason that
banks become riskier when deposit rates rise.
In this paper we have shown that when banks have control over their risk-taking,
the stability impact of lending market competition may be reversed. This is because
banks have an optimal amount of risk they want to hold and thus want to offset
the impact of safer borrowers on their balance sheet by taking on more risk. Since
competition in the loan market at the same time erodes banks’ franchise values, they
even want to overcompensate the impact of safer borrowers because their risk-taking
incentives increase.
Banks arguably have plenty of opportunities to modify their risk-taking. They may
direct lending to riskier projects (as in our model) but may also raise risk through
various other channels, such as by weakening lending standards, reducing monitoring
and screening efforts or lowering loan restrictions. There are also many ways for
banks to adjust their risk beyond their loan portfolios. For example, they can invest
more in risky (non-loan) assets or increase leverage. Thus, under quite plausible
scenarios the lending channel may reinforce the adverse impact of deposit market
competition on stability, rather than countering it.
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